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in the Semiconductor Industry 
Yingyi Tsai and Ching-Tang WU* 
In this paper, we provide another reason that may explain the 
wide adoption of outsourcing. approach in the semiconductor 
industry. We show the fab-lite business modeI of outsourcing 
wafer fabrication to foundries is optimal in. the presence of 
dem없1d uncertainty. This is because outsourcing helps the 
integrated device manufacturer (IargeIy the brand-producing fiIIn) 
to Iower its cost of capital investment in the case of low 
demand 와1d to improve its capacity allocation in the case of 
high demand. 
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1. Introduction 
In the semiconductor industry. one of the most striking changes 
precipitated by rapid technological progress has been wide adoption of 
the fab-lite business model. Fab-lite refers to integrated device 
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manufacturers or vertically integrated firms wi삼1 a corporate strategy 
bent toward u디lizing a fabless approach. 1 Figure 1 illustrates the 
trend of growing number of the fabless semiconductor companies 
since 1995. And Figure 2 shows the increasing revenue growth of the 
fabless companies in the semiconductor industry. 
Specialization and economies of scale have been identified as the 
major factors expl밍ning this ch없1ge. The usual argument is that a 
fab-lite model allows the fabless companies and integrated device 
manufacturers to focus on new product development by using 
efficiently its in-house resources (or facilitiesl on the one hand. and 
pennits both front-end foundry (for wafer fabrication) and back-end 
foundry (for packaging and tes디n밍 to spread the costs of capital 
investment over different contracts on the other. 
In this paper. we argue that demand uncertainty c없1 be a reason 
for outsourcing in the fast changing industry like semiconductor. 
Setting aside as explanations for outsourcing of cost advantage 
(Abraham and Taylor 1996; Feenstra and Hanson 1996) and corpo-
rate strate잃r (Deavers 1997; Shy and Stenbacka 2003). we focus on 
the effect for outsourcing of demand uncertainty. A basic under엔ng 
idea is that. in the presence of demand uncertainty. outsourcing 
renders a finn the flexibility to bal와lce a trade-off between ha띠ng 
in-house facilities shortage while demand unexpectedly surges and 
excess capa미디es otherwise. Although this assumption appears 
intuitively simple. it allows us to explore the rationale of outsourcing 
that can provide important insights into the use of fab-lite approach 
in a fast changing sector like semiconductor. The main feature of this 
analysis is how the presence of outsourcing opportùni양 under 
dem없ld unceπainty will affect a br없ld-producing firm ’s choices of 
business model and in-house capital investment. We will show. in the 
presence of demand uncertainty. that 밍1 outsourcìng (or non-
integrated) business model is optima1. By allowing for lower in-house 
I “Fabless" refers to the business method이0앓 of outsourcing the 
manufacturing of silicon wafers. Fabless companies focus on the design. 
development and marketing of their products and form alliances with 
foundries. or silicon wafer manufacturers. And “ Integrated Device Manufac 
turer (IDM)" refers to a class of semiconductor companies that owns an 
intemal silicon fab or. alternatively. the fabrication of wafers is integrated 
into its business. Nonetheless. even IDMs may undertake some outsourcing 
activities. "Foundry" is a service org밍lization that caters to the processing 
and manufacturing of silicon wafers. It ψpically develops and owns the 
process technology or paπners with another company for it. 
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capital investrnent. outsourcing renders higher profit th없1 it otherwise 
would if the Op디on to outsource is not available. Moreover. we also 
explore the employment implica디ons of outsourcing with a produc디on 
func디on incorpora디ng both labor and capital. Our results show that 
low-wage need not drive an increase in the gro뼈ng outsourcing 
activities. Hence. the general belief based upon cost advan떠ge of low 
wage in explaining outsourcing is yet to be further studied. 
까lroughout. in our discussion of outsourcing. we assume that only 
the manufactuπng segment of end product is outsourced. that 
outsourcing market is compe디디ve. namely. there is a mass of 
subcontractors compe디ng for contracts. and that outsourcing is at a 
brand-producing finn ’s disposal. but with a setup cost. 
The paper is organized as follows. After presenting the basic model 
in the next section. we characterize the op디mal capital investment 
under unceπainty with no outsour띠19 as a benchmark. In section III. 
we present results on the choices of business model in equilibrium. 
and explore 삼le implica디ons for these decisions of demand un-
certainty. Section N studies optim외 capital investment under the 
business models of integrated and non-integrated production with 
dem킹ld unceπainty. In section V. we discuss our results 하ld the role 
없ld applicability of the various assump디ons 삼lat we m와‘e on 
produc디on techn이ogy and distrtbution of random variable. 삼lUS 
pro찌ding some infm mal defense for interpre디ng our model as a 
qu려ita다ve characterization of reality. And we conclude in section VI. 
11. The Basic Model 
Consider a brand-producing finn facing 잉1 inverse demand 2 of 
P=Xy->'. (1) 
where P is the price. Y total production. c E (0. 1) an elas디city 
par밍neter. and X denotes an exogenous. absolutely continuous 
positive bounded random variable on a complete probability space 
2 This fOllllulation implies the br밍ld-producing firm alone faces overall 
demand shocks. For similar characterization. see. Caballero (1991) for 
demand at the indiVidual level facing a single compe디디ve fir m; and Pindyck 
(1993) for industry-i.vide demand shock facing a large Ilumber of equ외-sized 
fillllS. 
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(.9. F. ];)).3 
An import밍1t message that emerges from Equation (1) su짧ests the 
br와ld price consists of two components: Product design (for brand 
features) 없ld basic manufacture (for total supply). Hence. if we 
interpret X as br밍ld -specificity. 4 없ld Y 상le manufacturing segment 
for the brand. then this inverse demand function captures 산le impact 
on price of brand qu외ity and qu없1디ty. Altematively. Equation (1) 
characterizes a price reflecting 암le 껴ualitative" aspect of market 
demand owing to the indefinite outcome of “ product innovation". 5 
Production of Y requires the use of labor (L) and capital (K) by a 
linearly hom(핑eneous technology Y = K 1 βL ß• where βε(0‘ 1) denotes 
the share of L. To make the point that capital ínvestment is 
irreversible and not easily expandable.6 we assume production 
facíli다es must be installed before actual production c없1 . take place. 
Hence. the brand-producing firm first decides the amount of capital 
investment K (K는이. it then chooses. upon the realization of actual 
market demand. labor employment L (L는이. The cost to capital 없ld 
labor is denoted by r 밍ld ω. respectively. 
In the presence of demand unceπaínty. 삼le brand-producíng firm ’S 
problem is whether to adopt an integrated business model - in which 
case the film produces Y using its own facílities to seπe the market 
dem없ld; 0 1' a non-integrated (01' outsourcin밍 model - in which case 
market demand is seπed with in-house production Y and. possibly. 
the purchase of y from other firms in the primary market. 
In order to make our point in a manner as simple as possible. we 
assume . the br.없ld-producing finll withholds to itself the design of 
product. 없ld decides whethet to produce in-house 0 1' to purchase 
from 밍1 independent specialist firm the manufacturing segment of 
end product. Hence. in the present model we define outsourcing to 
me없1 that the brand-producing firm purchases the basic manu-
facturing component instead of carrying out the production of such 
3 The assumption of a bounded X suggests market demand should not 
tend to infinite. 
4 Altema디vely. X consists of the variations in consumer taste. the 
changes in technology. 없ld even a changing market environment. 
5 See Levhari 없ld Peles (1 973) for a jus디fication of .this characterization 
on “product innovation". 
6 Abel. Di성t. Eberly. and Pindyck (1996) and Dixit and Pindyck (1998) 
argued that “exp없ldability" of capital investment in the future gives rise to 
call option while inves디ga디ng the relations between optimal investment and 
uncertainty. 
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component at its own facility, given 없1 identical technology. We 
further assume , for simplicity, a uni얹ry mar훤1외 cost for each unit 
of the m하1Ufacturing component. Thus, with the possibili양 to 
outsource basic production, 삼le br하ld-producing finll faces a cost 
structure of 
C+y , if y>O , 
(C+y) 1 ω〉이 ω)= 
0 , if y=O , 
where 1 Iy>이 is the indicator function of Iy> 이， 삼le price per unit 
outsourCing output is nOIlllalized to one, 하ld C represents the 
setup costs incurred in establishing 하1 outsourcing partnership 
with the suitable subconìractor or in monitoring 삼le conσacts-7 
Hence, the br;없ld-producing fiIln’ s to떠1 produc디on cost is 
wL+rK. if y=O 
TC(K. L , y)= 




The choices of business model and capital investment are made in 
the context of unceπainty. Market demand condition is not known 
until 삼le finll enters actual production, given the chosen produc디on 
mode (깐: Sandmo 1971: Pindyck 1988). πlis tinling ref1ects that 
outsour'때19 can seπe as a de찌ce of nlitiga마19 the gap between 
unexpected demand shock 윈1d in-house production constraints 
underl꺼ng in capital investment, 없1d 삼1at any ex post adjustment is 
not possible since it is cost1y to alter the decisions over business 
model or capital investment in the li양1t of new market infoIIllation. 
Using Equa다ons (1) and (2) , 암le brand-producillg fiIlu's profit is 
given by 
7 Gro똥man 와ld Helpman (2002) pro띠de an intuitive jus뼈cation for this 
fOl1llulation since ‘ ... there are fIxed costs associated with ... searching for 
a poten디외 supplier". Further, this characterization of total outsouπing cost 
is similarly captured by Shy and Stenbacka (2003) , who modeled out-
sourcing in tel1llS of a trade-off between the ‘ make-or-buy" decision , except 
that we consider here a unitary mar맹1외 cost per unit outsourcing output. 
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πN(K， L) = X(K' - βLβ) , ε-ωL- yK, in-house 
π(K， L , y) = ~ (3) 
πF(K， L , 9};X(Kl βL β+y)'-"-ωL- yK-(C+y) , outsourcing 
Equa디on (3) highlights the problem facing a brand-producing firm 
in the presence of demand uncertain양， 삼mt is. it has to balance a 
trade-off between an irreversible capital investment with possible 
idle capaciψ and the op디on of avoiding such investment but having 
to incur a cost for ou성ourcing partnership and even paying the 
subcontractor a premium. 
Suppose a business model of integrated production (alternatively, 
outsourcing production is not possible) is chosen. This character-
ization corresponds to a standard model of op디mal capital investment 
under unceπainty in which a monopolist facing uncertain future 
demand chooses the amount of capital investment. The following 
proposi디on characterizes the optimal capi떠1 investment in a model of 
integrated production. 
Proposition 1 
If it chooses an integrated production mode. then the brand-
producing firm raises its capital investment. K N , with a greater 
expected market demand. i.e .. 
l β(l ε) 
KN=Hβ ë(E X 1 β(1← e) ) E 
’ 
for some positive constant Hβι· 
Proof: See Appendix A. 口
Proposition 1 implies that higher expected market demand will lead 
to greater capital investment. Thus. the dri띠ng force for a high 
dem없ld deseπes careful investigation. Successful quality improve-
ment or new product features provide an example. Levhari and Peles 
(1 973) showed formally , in a deterministic set디ng ， that quality 
improvement (as a form of product innovation) is able to raise market 
demand. This question of interpretation is important as it bears upon 
the issue of the nature of uncertainty. Indeed , if we interpret X as an 
indefinite outcome of product innovation , the brand-producing firm 
will increase its capital investment when it expects to successfully 
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deliver new invention (or improve upon product qu려ity) even it is not 
possible to outsource. Further. the above result also suggests that the 
brand-producing filIn will increase its capi없1 investment as the 
market demand becomes more volatile .8 
111. Choices of Business Model 
PrOpOSi디on 2 below establishes the conditions under which the 
business model of non-integrated produc디on (implying 삼le possib피ty 
to outsourcel is chosen in the presence of demand unceπainty. 
P,.oposition 2 
For 밍ly C 없ld K. there exists a cri디C려 X증(Kl such that (i) yO(Kl > 0 
if X>X~(K). and (피 yO(K)=O if X드X옹(K). where 
1 j ε (용) I - 6 Kt if C=O. 
X~(K)= 
sup (X: π인K. LO(Kl. yO(Kll 드 πN(K， L'v(KllI. if C>O. 
pr어f: See Appendix B. 딩 
Proposi디on 2 implies that outsourcing takes place only when the 
realized market demand is sufficiently large. and that the setup cost 
of outsourcing has a decisive impact on finu's choice of business 
model. Figure 3 illustrates the role of the outsourcing setup cost in 
삶fecting the outsourcing amount y. 
Appropriately interpreted. a sufficiently small setup cost irnplies a 
ne밍igibly low price of contrac디ng with a compa디ble supplier. πlUS. 
the outsourcing fÌIm is able to work with subcontractor(s) without 
rnuch difficulty whenever the realized rnarket dernand exceeds its 
8 Given two positive random variables X1 and X2. each with prol갱bility 
distribution μl 와ld μ2. Using Föllmer 때d Schied (2002) , we Irnow that if μI 
is UnifOIIIlly preferred over μ2. and X1 and X2 have the 5없ne mean , there 
exists a ‘ mean preserving spread" 0 such that μ2= μ 10. Since we have 
obtained, for given X1 and X 2 , that the relative optimal capital investments 
K1N and K2N e.상libi디ng KjV드Kt Hence. it follows that the brand-producing 
flI1Il will increase the capital investment as X becomes ‘ riskier". i. e .. more 
volatile. 
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FIGURE 3 
T꺼E IMPACT OF. C ON Y 
in-house capacity limit. This expl없ns the continuous curve charac-
terizing y and X as shown in Figure 3(a). An increase in the setup 
cost implies . it becomes more costly to engage in outsourcing 
acti띠ties. The br.없ld-producing firm no\V faces a trade-off between 
gains from outsourcing with rising setup cost and losses due to 
capaciψ shortage when market demand surges. The discontinuity of y 
at X6(K) in Figure 3 (b) implies the outsourcing finn will not use 
outside resources unless the gains from outsourcing exceeds the 
setup cost at the margin외 level. 
IV. Optimal Capital Investment under Uncertainty 
In the presence of uncertainty. 암le brand-producing firm chooses 
the capital investment to maximize its expected profit conditional on 
the available information. Thus, the brand-producing firm faces , 
depending upon whether it is possible to outsource or not, an op디mal 
capi없1 investment problem of 
max 
K>O 
E[ πN(K， LN(K))] , in-house 
(4) 
E[ π인K， LO(Kl, yO(K))I IX>Xi: IK)I+ πN(K， LN(K))I IX:;;Xt, IKU), outsourcing 
Proposition 3 characterizes the finn ’s op디mal capital investment 
under demand uncertainty with two models of integrated and 
non-integrated production. 
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Proposition 3 
In equilibrium , the capital investment levels with outsourcing and 
without, denoted by K잉 and K N respectiveψ， sa다sfy the following 
proper다es: (1) Kg increases in C. (2) Kg tends to KN as C→∞. 
Proof: See Appendix C. 口
Proposition 3 su잃ests a br와1d-producing fum will reduce its 
capi떠1 investment when the option of ou잉ourcing is av려lable. 
Nevertheless , it raises such investment for a hi함1er setup cost of 
outsour때19. In the extreme, as the cost of outsourcing becomes 
prohibitively hi방1 ， the amount of capital investment under out-
sourcing appro잉mates that in the absence of outsourcing. This result 
could therefore be interpreted as searching for the ‘ compatible" 
partnerin 삼1e outsourcing relationship. 찌Te have. thus , identified 삼le 
conditions under which capi떠1 investment are chosen in both 
business models of integrated and non-integrated production. 
v. Discussion 
Sections V-A and V-B state, and comment upon , some of the main 
propeπies of the equilib다um results as described in Propositions 2 
and 3. Section V-C compares 삼1e total outputs under the two modes 
of integrated production and non-integrated one. In sec디on V-D we 
argue that our results are robust to modification in the technology of 
the basic production and in the distribution of the random variable. 
A. 111ψlications Jor Outsour띠19 Choices oJ Unceπ따ntν 
To explore the implications for choices of business models of 
demand uncertainty. we further investigate the properties of X친K). 
Lemma 1 
(1) X~(Kl is strictly increasing both in C 뻐d in K. (2) For any 
C는0， 차(Kl decreases in ω and is independent of )'. 
Proof: See Appen띠x D. 口
Lemma 1 pro찌des an impoπ없1t insight into debates over the 
nature of outsourcing. If we interpret X혼(Kl as the fh m boundruy, 
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then P하t (1) of Lemma 1 implies that idiosyncra디c investment and 
industry-specific characteristics. such as capita1- and/or labor-intensiψ 
for production and knowledge content in the product. and their 
interactions play a critical role in detennining the outsourcing 
choices. Indeed. a low setup cost implies the brand-producing finn 
need not devoting much effort while monitoring the existing (or 
establishing for) outsourcing relationship. Hence. the boundary 
beyond which it chooses for outsourcing is low as the setup cost 
drops. Further. the critical value of this boundary is also affected by 
factor price. Part (2) of Lemma 1 su잃.ests the higher the wage rate. 
the lower the boundary beyond which outsourcing occurs. Appropri-
ately interpreted. the results characterize the growing off-shoring of 
basic production abroad from the developed economies subsequent to 
an increase in their domestic wages. in par디cular， under demand 
uncertain양. Notice , nevertheless. that outsourcing boundary is 
independent of capital price since it was incurred (a sunk cost) prior 
to actual production. 
B. Implications Jor Job Losses oJ Outsourcing 
The following Lemma characterizes the conditions for factor employ-
ment. 핑ven the chosen business model 없ld optimal capita1 invest-
ment. 
Lemma 2 
(l) If (y /1- β) 1 β{ω/β)ß 르 1. then K J> =O. Loo=O and νO=(X(l-
8))1/ 깐 Moreover, K r? =KN for all C if and only if X=O a.s.; and if 
P(X>이 >0， Koo <KN. (2) If (y /1- β) 1-β(ω/β)β< 1 and 
. ß 、
- l_R , A , l_R 
a.s .. (5) 
then K r? =KN for all C. Conv장sely， if (5). does not hold almost 
everywhere, Koo <KN. 
Pro앙: See Appe뼈x E. 口
The above results can provide an important insight into the issue of 
job losses in the presence of outsourcing. Indeed, Lemma 2 highlights 
that the extent of outsourcing is detennined crucially by the marginal 
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cost of in-house .production relative to the price of purchasirig from 
the specia1ized subcontractor. Part (1) ref1ects that the brand-
producirig filIn may sirnply purchase the basic manufacturing 
component and not enters the primary market at all if usirig own 
facili다es 1s relatively costly. And P:하t (2) characterizes a filIll’s choice 
under situations when there is substantial divergellce between the 
expected market demand and the rea]jzed one. This result offers a 
jus디fication as to why brand-producing fum does not opt for complete 
outsourCing and retains some in-house produc디on capacities (or 
capital investment) even 삼lOugh the outsourcing opportuni1y is 
available. 
C. Total Output under Integn따ed and Non-mtegrated Production. 
Theor엉m 1: In equilibrium. there exists Y~(KcC) 르X하K.?) such that 
(1) if X> Yt하(K'?인).’ then Y'?+yo>yγ서까N 
{β2외}μif X드 Y;;친(K.?꾀).’ then Y.앙 +yO<드E YYN( v\ • 
Proof: Using the results in Appen띠ces A-E. it is straightforward to 
verify this result. 口
Intui디vely. greater uncert없n1y implies a higher required retum on 
the use of outside resources if outsourcing is adopted. Hence. when 
the rea)jzed market demand is sufficiently hi앙1. the possibili1y to 
outsource pro띠des the filIll an avenue for profit increases by raising 
total output. 
D. Comments on Production Technology and the Distribution oJ X 
How would the results obtained in this paper ch없1ge if we consider 
a gener떠 function of the basic produc디on? Would the results change 
if a difTerent specifica디on for demand unceπainty is employed? We 
now sketch an argument that establishes the outcome is. in fact. 
unafTected: That is. the equilibrium choices of business model and 
capital investment (in an altemative set디ng) are iden디cal to the 
equilibrium ones (in the present set디ng). 
Clearly. the brand-producing filIn decides the business model and. 
simultaneously. the capital investment. In the presence of demand 
unceπ없nty. the adjustment mechanism made available to the film 
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consists of the variable input of labor 밍ld the opportunity to 
outsource .. if chosen. This suggests that capital investment. once 
installed. is independent from the variations in market demand. It is. 
therefore. evident that our results are robust to any modification of 
produc디on technology that involves the use of capital 없ld labor so 
long as the assumption of irreversibili양 and in-expandabiliψ for 
capital are retained. 
We have investigated the issue of uncertainty by characterizing X 
as random variable. It may. however. be reasonable (in some contexts) 
to explore different distribution of this variable. In that case onè caÌl 
still define the critical value of X양(K) and the optimal capital 
investment. With such a change in the setting that defines the firm 
profit. our results are unaffected. Propositions 1-3 still describe the 
equilibrium choices. 9 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper. we show that outsourcing provides brand-producing 
firms with increased flexibility in adjusting their resources as new 
information about demand conditions become available ‘ This argu-
ment can easily be extended to encompass even anticipated demand 
shifts. such as seasonal factors. Thus. outsourcing may well reflect 
an effort to deal with non-perfectly positively correlated anticipated 
demand variations. 
Assessing the importance of demand uncertainty in explaining 야le 
wide adoption of the outsourcing business model would require the 
following: First. evaluation of the importance of demand unceπainty 
in various industries: second. examination of the extent to which 
random demand components are correlated across industries; and 
third. investigation for the import없lce of production networks and 
adjustment costs. Although some industry studies seem to confirm 
both the presence of a market idiosyncratic uncertainty as well as the 
presence of inflexibility in capital investment. the issue at h없ld still 
begs for a more rigorous empirical 없lalysis. 
뀐n려ly. it is important to note that the interaction between demand 
uncertainty 와ld such factors as cost considerations. consumer 
9 However. with this change , the ar양lments and proofs are len알hier and 
restrictive. 
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preferences and strategic interactions - none of which 없'e dealt with 
in the present paper - may yield important new insi양lts. ln P하다­
cular. 삼le welfare implications of outsourcing can be fi끄mallyadd­
ressed once consumer utility is incorporated. Thus. ana1yses of these 
interactions feature hi방1 in our research agenda. 
(Received 8 Ju핑 2005: Revised 30 Novemher 2005) 
Appen퍼xA 
Proofof prηposi.tion 1 
We derive the op다mal capital investment using the backward 
induction. Upon the realization of market demand. for given K는 O. 삼le 
finn chooses an 01피m외 labor employment to ma입mize 
π N(K.L)=X(K1-ßL β)l- E-- IUL- YK. 
It is east to verify that the 01피m허 labor employment LN(K) exists 
using the first and second order conditions. Hence. the 01피mal choice 
of labor implies a finn profit of 
1 (1 -β)(1- e) 
π N(K. ~(K)) = Gß .• 'X 1- ß(1- e) K 1- β(1- e) - yK. (A. 1) 
where Gβ.e is a posi디ve constant depen며ng on β 킹1d e. 
The finn then decides on its capital investment to ma피mize 안le 
expected profit. Le .. 
1 (1 - ßl(1 - E) 
m~E[πN(K. LN(K)))=Gβ .•. [X1-ß(I-E))K 1 β(1-다 - yK. (A.2) 
K;:'U 
Using standard techniques to analyze the maximization problem of 
Equation (A.2). it is easy to ve디fy that the first- and second-order 
conditions of (A.2) are satisfied. and. thus. 핑ves us the required 
results. Notice that the direction of change of op다rnal capital 
investrnent under uncert밍nty depends only on the. conv잉강ty effect. 
Le .• for any 0< β< 1. K N is convex in X (안: Haπrnan 1972). 
DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND CHOICE OF BUSINESS MODEL 317 
Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 2 
If outsourcing is possible (y 흐이. then the firm chooses, for given K, 
an optimal labor employment to solve 
IIlax πg(K， L. y) , (A. 3) 
L..y ..>u 
To investigate (A.3). we first consider an optimization problem of 
“ definite outsourcing" (í.e. , y > 0), that is , 
ma윷 a;?{K, L , 9)=X(Ki βLβ+y)l-E_ωL- yK-(C+y). (A.4) 
L.y츠U 
Clearly, the relation between π깐K. L , g) and R(K, L. g) iS 밍ven 
by 
iig(K, L. 0) +C르 ii;?(K, L. 이. for y=O. 
πg(K， L , y)= 
iig(K, L , y) , for y>O. 
The op디mal solution to (A. 5) exists if 
‘ -0 
u"으=X(1 -ë)(K1 βLβ +y)-eβiK1 βLβ-1-ω=0， 
aL 
a~o 
깐으=X(1 -ë)(K1 -βLβ +ν)-.--1 =0. ay 
(A. 5) 
This implies that optim외 L and y , in equilibrium. must be given by 
LO(K) = 





Further, it is easy to verifY the second-order condition is satisfied. 
Using (A. 7), we see that if(K) 는 o if and only if X므￡(K):=(1/(1-E)) 
{β/ω)( ß.:/ (l -β))K'-. This implies the value of X plays a crucial role in 
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determining the 01피ma1 solution of (A.4). η1US. we separate our 
discussion into two cases: IwE 잉: X(ω) 드X(K)} 와ld Iωε .Q: X(ω)> 
X(K)). 
First. on the set Iωe 깅: X(w) 드X{K)l. we have j。(K} 르 O. Hence. 삼le 
op디m떠 solution to equa디on (A.4) occurs on the boundary y = O. This 
coincides with the case of no outsourcing. and. thus. the op디ma1 
solution of (A.3) is (L o(K). yO(K)) = (LJI'’ (KJ, 0). 
Second. on the set IwE 9: X(ω) 드X(K)). 킹1 interior solution holds 
and (떠KJ， .it(K)) is the Op디mal solution to (A.4). Note. however. from 
(A.5) 야lat 
π앙(K， L. 0) = ii앙(K， L. O)+C. 
We. therefore. compare if-' 
π앙(K， ì.o(K). yO(K)) > π"(K. LN’(K)). 
Since the monop이ist involves outsourcing if 킹ld only if the payoff 
generated from doing so is greater than it otherwise would have 
been. For fIxed K, define by Fc(X. K) the payoff differences between 
the two outsourcing regimes. i. e .. 
Fc(X. K)= πF(K ， L。(K) ， j。(K)) - π N(K. L''1(K)) > O. (A.8) 
A straightf아ward ca1culation shows. for any X>X(K). that (a Fc/ 
a X) > O. This implies Fc( .. K) is strictly increasing to infInite on 
(X(K). ∞). FurtheIIIlOre. Ilotice that 
Fc(X(K). K) = -C. 
It follows 야1at if C=O. Fo(X. K)>Fo(X(K). K)=O for 머1 X>X(K). 윈ld 
if C>O. Fc(X(K). K)<O. Since Fc( .. K) is strictly increasing in X to 
∞ on (X(K). ∞). we know that Fc(X. K) =0 has a unique solution 
for X>X(K). And. the solution is 밍ven by 
X양(K) = sup IX: Fc(X. K) 드이. (A.9) 
까1US. we have established that Fc(X. K) >Fc(X~(KJ， K) =0 for 외1 X> 
X~(K). This result suggests that. givell K 므 O. the fiI m will engage in 
outsourcing (yo(K) > 이 when X is suffIciently large (i. e .. X>X~(K)). 
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Appendix C 
、
Proof of Proposition 3 
Due to Proposition 2 , we 끼πite the monopolist's expected profit as 
Gc(K):=E[ πcO(K.LO(KJ. yO(K)) I ，x>xt(떼+ π N(K. LN(K)) I ，ùx하K)}l. (A. l이 
To prove Proposition 2. we proceed in the following fout steps , 
Step 1. The existence of Koo , Given C = O. differentiating (A. l이 with 
respeCt to K .. we have 
’ 
β(1- e) 
I - e 
ρ \ 1- β(l-ê) . "'.. , • n ,. 
G'o(K) = (1 -β) !꾀 (1 -8)1-β(I-e) K 1-β(1- e) 
W' 
Uo(K) , (A. ll) 
‘ 
where 
Uo(K) =EI (X 1- 이1- e) _ XÓ(K) 1- ß(i - e) )1α<XμK)} 









Thus. we separate our discussion of (A. 12) into two cases: 
(A. 12) 
• 
띠 ((r/(I-β')) (1 찌(w/ β) 이2: 1. Since the first teIIn in (A. 12) is 
strictly nega디ve for K>O. G'o(K)<O for any K>O. This suggests 
Go(K) has a global m밍강mum at K=O; í.e .. K~=O. 
(ii) (( r / (1 -β)) (1 에(ω/β)이< 1. Due to 
(I-ß)(I 一 e) 





with a positive constant M1• Using the fact that Uo(O) =0. we 
see 삼1at Uo(K)>O if K is small enough. Moreover. we have 
established that Uo(K) • ∞ if K→∞. Therefore. there exists a 
unique K~ such tQat Uo(K t?) = O. which suggests G'o(K~) = O. 
Hence, Go(K) has a g1ob머 ma찌mum at K~E(Ö. ∞) . 
Step 2. The existen야 of KF for genera1 C. Differentia디ng (A. l이 
with respect to K. we have 
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E 
G’c(K)=M2K I-ß(1- 다 Uc(K). (A. 13) 
where M2 is a positive constant and 
아(K)=Uo(K)+E (X늄파-X~(K)I- β(1- El ) Itx때l<X<양 (K lI I (A. 14) 
Recall Fc(Xt(K). K)=O. and the results obtained in Step 1. we have 
Uo(K)→-∞ as K→∞. Moreover. notice E[X(l/~'’ )<∞. the second 
teI m in (A. 14) is strictly posi디ve 밍ld bounded. Thus. UdK) < 0 잃 K 
large enough. Together with UdO)늘 O. we have established that 
there exists a zero of UdK). which is 외so 명obal ma꾀murn of 
GdK). This proves the e잉stence of }양 for gener려 C. 
Step 3. The monotonicity of K~. Frorn (A. 13) we have. for fIxed K. 
CI>C2르 O. 
E 
G능， (K) - G'c,(K) = M2K 1- β(1- El (Uc,(K) - Uc.(K)). 
Re떼1. frorn Lernrna 1. that X~(K) <Xζ(K)<X캉， (K). πlis irnplies 
Uc， (K) 一 Uι(K)=EI(X다파 -XÓ(K)륨과 )1원 (Kl<X<X~ ， (K lI l >0 
Hence 
G'c, (K) > G'c,CK). (A. 15) 
for 려1 K. Following the results obtained in Step 2 we know Gc.(K) 
has at least one local rna찌rnurn (which occurs at the points such 
that G'cJK) = 이. For sirnplicity. we assurne that GcJK) has two local 
rna성rna: At K! and at K2 with K! <K2 (For the case with one 하ld n 
local rnaxirna. we rnay use the sirnilar argurnent.). 
(i) KK =K1=O. Clearly Kg， ~O=Kg •. 
(피} 뺑~ =K! >0. Le .• Gc.{K!) 는 GC.(K2). Due to (2이 and since Gc• (K) > 
o for 려1 K<K!. G'c，(K) >G날(K)는 o for 려1 K드KI' Following Step 
2. we know that Gt, (K) = 0 has at least one solution. Together 
with Gc, (}이 >0 for 려1 K<K!. we see 암lat 려1 삼le zeros of 
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Gc,(K) is larger than Kl. i.e .. Kg, >Kl=K8,. 
(ìii) Kg, =K2. i.e .. Gc,!K Il < GC)K2). Due to 
we have 
(A. 16) 
Suppose that the glob외 maximum of Gc,(K). K8" is less than 
KK=K2. Using (A. 15) we know Gc떼> Gc,(K) > 0 for 외1 K<Kl. 
Thus. there exists a solution to Gc,(K)=O , denoted by K8" 
between Kl and K2. Furthermore, since GC,(K2)>Gc)K2)=O and 
Gc,(K) < 0 as K large enough (see Step 2) , Gc, (K) has at least 
one local maximum larger than K2' say K. Because of (A. 15) 
and (A. 16) , we get 
> Gc ,(K8,l, 
which clearly contradicts the result that K8, is the 밍obal 
maximum of Gc,(K). This implies the global maximum for 
Gc,(K) must occur at the place Iarger than K2 , i.e. , K g, >K2= 
KO c, . 
Hence , K8, > Kg, for C1 > C2. In other words , K8 is increasing in C. 
Step 4. Using Equation 
πF{K， L。(K) ， go(K)) 二 πc?(K， L o(K) , yO(K ))I lx>xt,(K)! + πN(K ， LN(K))Iκx Î: (K)}, 
and note that X하K)→∞ as C→∞， it is easy to veri:fY that GdK)• 
E[πN(K ， LN(K ))J as C→∞. Further, using Step 3 , we know that Kg is 
increasing in C, thus Kg드 K" for all C. 
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Appendix D 
안oof of Lemma 1 
(1) If C=O. then àXÓ(K)/ àK=(e/ (1 -e))(β/ω)ß，'/(I-ß)K ，'- I >O: and if 
C>O, using (A. 9) and note that Fc(X홍(K) ， K) = O. and that Fc(X, K) is 
continuous in K. we know X~(K) must sa디sfY 
1 1- .. 
Xee (1 -el e +(죠) 1-β (1 -β)K-C 
β(1- e) l (1 - ß)(1 - e) (A. 17) 
β(1- E) ., 1 β(1- .. ) 
(1 -β(1 -e)) X 
Differentia디ng (A. 17) with respect to K and C , respectively, we have 
both àX홍(K)/ àK and àXi:(K)/ àC are s띠ctly posi디ve for any K>O, 
imp밴ng that 짜(K) is strictly increasing both in K and C. 
(2) Using (A. 17) , it is easy to verifY that both of àX하Kl/ àω and 
àxi:(Kl/ àω are sσictly nega디ve since A< 1. 
Appendix E 
Proof of Lemma 2 
(1) (r/ (1-β)) 1- 이ω/β)β 르 1. Using the results contained in Pro-
posi디on 1 와ld Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 3 , we know if (r/ 
(1 -β11 1 β(ω/β)β :::: 1, KN=K암=0 if and only if X三o a.s. 
(2) (r/ (1-β11 1 β{ω/β)β < 1. As shown in the Step 1 in the proof 
of Proposition 3 , it is easy to show that if (r / (1 -β))1 β (w/，β}β< 1， 
the equa디on G'o(Kl=O has two different solutions 0 and Koo, and 
>0 , if KE(O , Koo). 
G'o(Kl (A. 181 
<0, if K>Koo. 
Thus , KN=KoO 표 and only if 
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G'o(K이= Y E I ((X~(KN)) 1- ß(1- e) -X 1-꽤)1짧(KN)} =0. 
Elx 1-β(1- e) 




which is equivalent to 
X 1- ß(l- e) ) 1 IX찌 (KN )} = O. 
β 
a.s .. 
X 1-β(1- e) 드X~(KN) 1- β(l-e} = 1-β β \ 1-β EJX I -페1- e) 
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